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Learned Hand has said, "offers an easy escape from embarrassing
chores,"29 it is submitted that the decision in the principal case did not
serve the ends of substantial justice.
It remains to be noted whether, when dealing with the exclusionary
rule and jury misconduct which bears on the evidence considered by
the jury, a distinction should be made between civil and criminal
cases. In civil cases the quantum of proof is less than in criminal
cases, and jury misconduct might reasonably be given less weight
in determining if the verdict ought to be impeached. On the other
hand, the requirement of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
in a criminal case would indicate that any misconduct which could
reasonably affect a juror's vote should be thoroughly investigated.
In addition, a unanimous verdict is seldom required in civil cases, and
it would seem reasonable to disregard a civil juror's misconduct if
his vote was not essential to the verdict. On the other hand, jurors who
receive unauthorized evidence often communicate their misappro-
priated knowledge to other jurors, and the misconduct of one juror
may taint the verdict of all. It is apparent that, in order to effectuate
a distinction between civil and criminal cases in application of the
exclusionary rule, a court would be required to undertake a close
investigation of the jurors' activities both within and without the
juryroom. It is doubtful that a court in either a civil or criminal
case would be willing to undertake such an investigation, which might
involve violations of juryroom secrecy.
LIMITING LANGUAGE IN UNPURCHASED POLICY
PROVISION DOES NOT APPLY TO
PURCHASED COVERAGE
Plaintiff's truck was hit by a tree felled by a logging contractor's
employee. The truck was insured by defendant insurance company
against damage due to collision,1 but plaintiff had not purchased cover-
age under the comprehensive clause.2 Plaintiff brought an action
29 Jorgenson v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1947).
1 "Coverage E-Collision or Upset: To pay for direct and accidental loss of or
damage to the automobile ... caused by collision of the automobile with another
object.... Jones v. Virginia Sur. Co., 401 P.2d 570, 571 (Mont. 1965).
2 "Coverage D-Comprehensive Loss or Damage to the automobile, Except by
Collision or Upset: To pay for direct and accidental loss of or damage to the auto-
mobile ... except loss caused by collision of the automobile with another object ....
Breakage of glass and loss caused by ... falling objects ... shall not be deemed loss
caused by collision or upset." Ibid.
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against defendant insurer for the loss. Relying upon the language of
the unpurchased comprehensive clause, the trial court held that de-
fendant's liability did not include loss caused by falling objects. On
appeal, a divided Montana Supreme Court reversed. Held: When an
insured does not purchase one form of insurance coverage, the insurer
may not deny liability on the basis that the loss was excluded from the
purchased coverage by the unpurchased provision. Jones v. Virginia
Sur. Co., 401 P.2d 570 (Mont. 1965).1
Because the collision clause in the policy contained no exceptions to
coverage, the falling tree constituted a covered "collision" unless the
comprehensive clause could be considered as limiting the collision
coverage.' In determining which clauses of the policy constituted the
contract between the parties in the principal case, the court was faced
with a choice between two conflicting lines of authority, one holding
that all coverages offered in the policy-whether purchased or not-
constitute the contract and are considered in determining the extent of
coverage purchased,' and the other holding that only those provisions
actually purchased are a part of the contract.6
The majority of the court reasoned that it was "wise and just" not
to consider the failure to purchase comprehensive coverage as an
indicium of intent, as to do so would require the unwarranted assump-
tions that an insured reads all coverages offered in a particular policy
and that he reads them as mutually exclusive. The ambiguity created
by the existence of apparently contradictory clauses was resolved
3 41 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 262; 17 S.C.L.Q. 639 (1965).
4 In T.C. Power Motor Car Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 69 Mont. 563,
223 Pac. 112 (1924), 35 A.L.R. 1028 (1925), the Montana Supreme Court held that,
in policies which insure against collision with other objects without limitation,
coverage is provided for any loss caused by contact with anything that can be de-
scribed as an object, irrespective of whether the object was moving or stationary.
The court held that an object is anything tangible and visible, and is not confined to
objects similar to an automobile or other vehicle. Under this broad definition of
"collision," the court in the principal case had little difficulty in finding that a
collision had occurred. Similarly, under most authorities it is irrelevant whether
both bodies are in motion, or only one, or whether the automobile is moving or
stationary. E.g., Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. American Compounding
Co., 211 Ala. 593, 100 So. 904 (1924); Ra v. Motors Ins. Corp., 48 N.M. 9, 144
P.2d 676 (1944). See generally 5 APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3201
(1943); 6 COOLEY, BRIEFs ON INsuRANcE 4993-5000 (2d ed. 1928); 11 CoUcH,
INsURANCE 2n §§ 42:192-94 (1963) ; 2 RxcnrAMws, IN URANCE § 288 (5th ed. 1952).5 E.g., Saul v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 173 Kan. 679, 250 P.2d 819
(1952); Fisher v. California Ins. Co., 236 Ore. 376, 388 P.2d 441 (1964); Iowa
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 157 Tex. 183, 300 S.W2d 639 (1957); Providence Wash.
Ins. Co. v. Proffitt, 150 Tex. 207, 239 S.W2d 379 (1951); Glen Falls Ins. Co. v.
McCown, 149 Tex. 587, 236 S.W.2d 108 (1951).
GE.g., Barnard v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co, 81 So. 2d 132 (La. App. 1955),
54 A.L.R.2d 374 (1957), 24 U. CHI. L. RLv. 170 (1956); Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Adams, 45 Tenn. App. 23, 319 S.W2d 486 (1958).
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against the insurer by application of the doctrine that insurance policies
are read most strongly against those who have written the terms.
Therefore the court looked only to the purchased provision, and re-
fused to allow the insurer to escape liability on the basis that coverage
under the policy was controlled by an unpurchased clause.
The leading case upholding the "all-clauses included" position is
Saul v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co.' The insured, whose truck was
destroyed by flood waters, had purchased coverage against collision
and against external discharge or leakage of water, but had not pur-
chased provisions for coverage against damage by flood or rising water.
The court held that all coverages contained in the policy form should
be considered in determining the extent of coverage purchased. The
court, considering the issue to be identification of the contract between
the insured and his insurer-rather than interpretation of that contract
-stated:
[T]he policy did not confuse the subject of damages from "external dis-
charge or leakage of water" with damages from "flood or rising waters"
but that on the contrary it listed them as separate and distinct coverages.
Plaintiff did not buy and defendant did not assume the latter risks.8
One of the problems presented by these cases is that they have failed
to indicate whether any reasonable limitation exists as to the location
of a clause which would be effective to limit liability. Some cases seem
to indicate that a statement that loss due to falling objects is not a
collision, contained in an obscure and unpurchased provision such as
"medical payments" or "uninsured motorist," would effectively limit
liability under a purchased collision coverage? Theoretically, then, an
insurance company could grant coverage in one clause and then, in
another obscure and specialized part of the policy which was not
purchased, limit the purchased coverage.
7 173 Kan. 679, 250 P.2d 819 (1952).
8 Id. at 823.
9 In Saul v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co., supra note 7, at 822, the court stated:
[T]he accepted rule is that the intent of the parties must be determined by a
consideration of the contract as a whole and not by lifting some one sentence
or provision from the policy.... The court must look to the entire contract of
insurance for a true understanding of what risks are assumed by the company
and what risks are excluded.
In Fisher v. California Ins. Co., 236 Ore. 376, 388 P.2d 441, 444 (1964), the court stated:
"We do not think it is reasonable to say that the insured is required to read only that
part of a policy which directly deals with the coverage he seeks." See also Glen Falls
Ins. Co. v. McCown, 149 Tex. 587, S.W.2d 108, 111 (1951) : "The coverages offered but
rejected are in the policy.., the same as those offered and accepted, therefore it is




A further problem presented is that an insured, in reading his
purchased clause, often finds no internal reference to other clauses as
limiting his purchased coverage. Even if an insured does read the
unpurchased comprehensive clause, there is often no express indication
that the limiting language applies to the collision clause. Such was the
situation in the principal case. In short, this first line of cases examines
the insurance transaction in its complete context, recognizing that a
purchaser of insurance has a choice of provisions to purchase, and
assumes that the failure to purchase certain policy provisions evidences
a rejection of those provisions and the coverage they provided.1" When
the insured later tries to recover for loss from the rejected risks, these
courts refuse to allow it.
The leading decision in the second line of cases, holding that an
unpurchased clause is not part of the insurance contract, is Barnard v.
Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.," in which the fact situation was identical
to that in the principal case. Allowing the insured to recover under
the collision clause, despite the limitation contained in an unpurchased
comprehensive clause similar to that in the principal case, the court
stated:
Plaintiff's rights are governed by the provisions of [the] clause ... per-
taining to collision or upset. There is no provision there for excluding
damage or loss caused by "falling objects." ...
... It is sufficient for the purpose that no positive and definite exclusion
was provided .... Neither would the fact that under other provisions of
the policy plaintiff could have also obtained protection against loss and
damage through the happening of the accident involved relieve the in-
surer....
The reasoning of the second line of decisions, which was adopted by
the court in the principal case, rejects the theory that an insured, by
purchasing on provision, intends to exclude all other coverages offered
in the same policy. Rather, the purchased provisions are regarded as
the complete integration of the insurance transaction, and only that
which is stated in the purchased provisions affects the rights of the
10 Saul v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co., supra note 7, at 822: "[Ilt plainly ap-
pears in the policy various types of insurance are available and that the insured declined
to purchase the kind of insurance which would have afforded the protection he now
claims."
1181 So. 2d 132 (La. App. 1955).
1Id. at 137, 138.
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parties. 3 The courts refuse to give effect to limitations which were not
written into the purchased provision, and do not accept the argument
that the insured's selection of coverage amounted to an intention to
have the unpurchased provisions be considered part of the contract."
Thus, under the rule of the principal case, a party who has purchased
only collision coverage gets some of the same coverage obtained by a
party who purchased only comprehensive coverage. However, con-
sumer protection in buying insurance would be furthered if shoppers
for insurance could compare the cost of one kind of coverage with that
of another from the same insurer, as well as costs of identical kinds of
coverage from different insurers. When part of a coverage other than
that apparently purchased is judicially included in the purchased pro-
visions, the difficulty in accurately comparing the cost of insurance is
increased. If the principal case had been decided differently a cost
comparison by a prospective insured would be meaningless unless he
first determined whether there was coverage stated in the policy but
not expressly included in the purchased provision.
Under the approach adopted in the principal case, the lack of
internal reference between clauses granting coverage and clauses limit-
ing coverage created an ambiguity to be resolved by the rules of inter-
pretation of ambiguous contracts. 5 The court resolved this ambiguity
in plaintiff's favor, by use of the principle of construing ambiguous
terms of a contract most strongly against the party drafting them, " a
principle frequently applied to insurance policies." The rationale
behind the use of this principle of construction in the insurance field is
13 E.g., Barnard v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., supra note 11, at 138: "Neither
would the fact that under provisions of the policy plaintiff could have also obtained
protection against loss and damage through the happening of the accident involved
relieve the insurer .... "
14 "Statement of defendant's liability under this [collision] coverage ... is not
affected by apparently contradictory expressions under other, and distinct clauses....
Id. at 137.
15 Notwithstanding the numerous technical phrases which are usually inserted in
insurance policies, they remain written contracts to be interpreted by the same
rules which apply to other contracts. 2 COOLEY, BPiFrs ON INSURANCE 961 (2d ed.
1927) ; 1 CoucH, INSURANCE 2D § 15:15 (1963) ; 3 RciADs, INSURANCE § 391 (5th
ed. 1952).
16 See 3 ComRiN, CONTRACTS §559 (1960) ; 4 WiLLiSTON, CONTRACTS § 621 (3d ed.
1961) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 236(d) (1932).
17 "This rule finds frequent application in regard to policies of insurance, which
are ordinarily prepared solely by the insurance company, and therefore, the words
of the policies are construed most strongly against it." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS§ 236, comment d (1932). Some courts have refused to use this principle in inter-
preting insurance policies, relying on other principles to reach an equitable result.
E.g., Landwehr v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 159 Md. 207, 150 At. 732 (1930) (the
intent of the parties as gathered from the whole instrument); McGinley v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 88 N.H. 108, 184 Atl. 593 (1936) (what a reasonable
[VoL. 41
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that "policies of insurance are made on printed forms carefully pre-
pared in the light of wide experience, by experts employed by the in-
surer, and in the preparation of which the insured has no voice.""5
Other reasons which have been given to justify application of the rule
are, first, that policies are rarely understood by an insured and he
should be protected from his own ignorance under such circumstances, 9
and second, to effectuate the basic purpose of an insurance contract,
i.e., protection of the insured."0
Perhaps the most cogent resolution of the problem presented by the
principal case was in Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Proffitt." Holding
that an unpurchased comprehensive clause in a policy should be con-
sidered in determining the extent of the purchased collision coverage,
the court interpreted the language of the unpurchased clause as not
restricting the purchased coverage.22 Instead of resorting to the rule of
strict construction against the insurer, the court held that one clause in
the policy may not limit another unless there is an internal reference in
the clauses to that effect. Because of poor draftsmanship by the insur-
ance company, the court found that the instrument as a whole repre-
sented the collision clause to be unrestricted, and that the parties so
intended. The court in Proffitt told the insurance companies what
could be done to limit liability, guidance which the other decisions
have failed to furnish: move the limitation on coverage from the
comprehensive clause to the collision clause.
person in the position of the insured would understand the words of the policy to
mean). For a criticism of the rule of strict construction, see Kuvin, Miscotstruction
of Insurance Policies, 433 INs. L.J. 102 (1959).
is 1 CoucH, INsummc 2D § 15:77 (1959).
29 Id. at § 15:78.
20 Id. at § 15:80.
21150 Tex. 207, 239 S.W.2d 379 (1951).
22 Id. at 381:
The provision of Coverage A [comprehensive] that loss caused by... falling ob-
jects... shall not be deemed loss caused by collision or upset cannot be used to defeat
a recovery under Coverage B-1 [collision]. The obvious purpose of this provision was
to enlarge the liability of petitioner [insurer] under Coverage A and was not to re-
strict the liability of petitioner under Coverage B-1. To those who paid for Coverage
A petitioner obligated himself to pay for all loss or damage to the automobile except
loss or damage caused by collision or upset. By the quoted language it then removed
any possibility of defeating recovery for loss or damage resulting from the causes
named .... If petitioner had intended the language used in the last sentence of Coverage
A (enlarging its liability under that coverage) to be used also to restrict its liability
under coverage B-i, the same language could have been written into Coverage B-1
as a limitation of liability.
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